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Introduction 
The year 2014 was marked by intense protests against the police after the killings of 
Michael Brown in Ferguson and Eric Garner in New York and the subsequent failure to indict 
the police officers that killed them. While large scale protests were held across the United States, 
an unexpected event happened: two police officers were shot to death in New York on December 
20, 2014 by a man who was allegedly outraged by the Brown and Garner cases. The momentum 
for the Black Lives Matter movement in New York City was derailed as the police killings 
generated a backlash effect against demonstrators by critics and local leaders who maintained 
that it was not appropriate to keep protesting given the horrific nature of the police killings. 
Meanwhile, the New York police blamed the protesters for those killings. These events show that 
in the midst of a mobilization process, protesters can withdraw from the streets when unexpected 
events occur, and external pressure encourages them to stop demonstrating.  
This study highlights the role that critical events play in the demobilization of protest 
campaigns. In the context of an ongoing protest campaign, critical events may alter protesters’ 
tactics and their willingness to continue demonstrating, leading to the demobilization of the 
campaign. Typically, social movement scholars argue that protest campaigns demobilize as a 
consequence of a polarization between radical and moderate protesters or the cooptation of the 
campaign leaders. I offer critical events as an alternative causal mechanism and argue that 
protest campaigns in ethnically divided societies are particularly combustible as they have the 
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potential to trigger unintended communal violence.1 When such violence occurs, elite strategies 
change, mass support declines and campaigns demobilize. 
The connection between critical events and the demobilization of a campaign has 
remained largely under-theorized mainly because scholars have typically associated critical 
events with increased protest activity (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, Rasler 1996).  For instance, 
Rasler (1996) shows that the burning down of the Abadan cinema resulting in 400 deaths was 
one of the important critical events that escalated the protests during the Iranian revolution. 
Similarly, Lohmann (1994) argues that President Gorbachev’s visit to East Germany in October 
1989 where he publicly urged East German leaders to implement reforms was seen as a signal 
that the Soviet military forces would not intervene if people started protesting.  In both cases, 
critical events are seen as having an escalatory effect on mass protests against the regime. 
Nonetheless, critical events can also have a de-escalatory effect. According to Staggenborg 
(1993:320), critical events are significant turning points that, whether intentional or not, alter 
expectations and perceptions of threats and opportunities, affecting the outcomes of protest 
campaigns. This definition allows for the possibility that critical events can lead to the 
demobilization of a protest campaign. For instance, the 1990/91 Gulf War was responsible for 
the demobilization of the First Intifada protest campaign. Until the Gulf War, Palestinian leaders 
                                                          
1 Communal violence  refers to an intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, 
lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic 
group, with the victims chosen because of their group membership (Horowitz 2001:1).  The 
intention to kill and the civilian nature of the perpetrators and the victims are the defining 
characteristics of communal violence. 
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used nonviolent tactics to convey their message to the international community, knowing that 
Israel’s military response would evoke international criticism. The onset of the Gulf War, 
however, shifted international attention away from the campaign, and created an opportunity for 
the Israelis to clamp down on the Palestinian activists by imposing a total curfew, limiting the 
Intifada’s activities significantly (Alimi 2009:228-29). 
To investigate how critical events can demobilize a protest campaign, I conduct a 
quantitative analysis of a single case study, the anti-foreigner protest campaign in the northeast 
Indian state of Assam between 1979 and 1985. The critical event in the Assam protest campaign 
proved to be the unexpected rise of communal violence in February 1983.  By using original and 
fine-grained data collected from The Indian Express, a daily newspaper, I demonstrate that the 
1983 communal violence played a major role in the demobilization of the campaign in this 
ethnically divided state.  Though the communal violence was neither planned nor directed by the 
protesters, it had a significant impact on the campaign by compelling the campaign leaders to 
suspend protests temporarily, and leading to the withdrawal of one of the main ethnic groups that 
originally supported the campaign.  Consequently, protests declined dramatically, never reaching 
the levels they did during the first four years of the campaign.  
This study makes several important contributions to the theoretical literature.  First, it 
examines the link between critical events and the demobilization process of a protest campaign.  
Second, this research expands our understanding of how protest campaigns demobilize.  So far, 
scholars have mostly identified the use of violence or the creation of formal organizations as the 
main determinants of demobilization (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Nepstad 2011, Piven and 
Cloward 1977, Tarrow 1989).  This study identifies communal violence in ethnically divided 
societies as another causal explanation. In societies where multiple ethnic groups compete for 
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power, communal violence that occurs during a protest campaign, yet is not directed by the 
campaign leaders, is likely to lead to demobilization.  Communal violence pushes protest leaders 
to change strategies and results in the withdrawal of and rank and file support.  Third, this 
research brings a more nuanced understanding to the effects of violence on the demobilization of 
protest campaigns.  Traditional studies of nonviolent resistance campaigns assume that 
opposition groups choose to pursue nonviolent strategies and strictly adhere to such tactics even 
when faced with severe repression.  If they fail to maintain nonviolent discipline, then the 
campaign is more likely to fail to achieve its political goal as protesters leave the streets in the 
face of violence.  In short, the use of nonviolent tactics is an important factor that avoids the 
premature demobilization of the campaign before groups gain important concessions from the 
government (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Nepstad 2011, Schock 2013, Schock 2005, Sharp 
1973).  On the other hand, social movement scholars who have studied the dynamics of protest 
campaigns note that radical groups frequently use violence, and this development allows the state 
to distinguish the radicals from the moderates.  By making concessions to the moderates, state 
leaders are able to demobilize the protest campaign by coopting the moderates while isolating the 
radicals (della Porta and Tarrow 1986, Tilly 1978).  Both of these strands of research assume that 
violence is a tactical choice designed to achieve political goals.2 Yet, I argue that violence is not 
                                                          
2 My understanding of protest campaign is similar to that of social movement scholars in that it 
involves both types of actions: nonviolent ones as well as low level forms of violence, short of 
organized military operations.  While demonstrations, boycotts, or strikes are nonviolent tactics 
typically used during protest campaigns, the potential for a violent outbreak exists as people 
might throw stones, break windows, or set vehicles on fire.   
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necessarily strategic, and when it is unorchestrated in the context of a protest campaign, it can 
produce a shock that may demobilize a protest campaign, as happened in Assam.  Thus, the aim 
of this study is to examine protest campaigns and improve our understanding of their dynamics 
in terms of how and when the scale and scope of protest actions escalates or de-escalates.  
 
Theoretical Foundations: The Demobilization of Protest Campaigns and Critical Events 
 Scholars who have studied protest campaigns frequently suffer from two limitations.  
First,  scholars have mostly focused on the factors that predict success and have only included 
failed nonviolent campaigns as negative cases to identify the conditions for the achievement of 
the campaign’s stated goals (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Nepstad 2011, Schock 2005).  This 
approach tends to overlook dynamics that are unique to unsuccessful outcomes.  Second, 
scholars of protest campaigns usually pay more attention to the origins and spread of 
mobilization rather than the demobilization process (Koopmans 1997, McAdam 1983, Tarrow 
1998, Tilly 1978).  Although demobilization is a crucial process that occurs within the trajectory 
of protest campaigns, it has attracted surprisingly little theoretical attention.3  Of the few scholars 
                                                          
3 Demobilization refers to the process by which protesting decreases in scale and scope and 
eventually ends (Tilly and Tarrow 2007).  While demobilization typically evokes an 
unsuccessful outcome, these two concepts are distinct.  Although the demobilization of a 
nonviolent campaign often leads to its failure, demobilization might also precede a successful 
outcome. For example, the demobilization of the Baltic and Crimean Tatar protests in 1987 and 
1988 under coercive measures eventually led to a successful outcome as they triggered other 
protests, ending with the fall of the Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002). 
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that do study demobilization, the focus is on the cooptation or polarization processes.  For 
instance,  Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that the development of formally structured 
organizations greatly increases the prospects for elite influence and the cooptation of  campaign 
leaders, thus, diminishing the campaign’s disruptive potential.  Others such as Tarrow (1989) and 
della Porta and Tarrow (1986) maintain that demobilization is the inevitable outcome of the 
expansion of a protest campaign and is largely driven by the polarization between moderates and 
radicals.  
I advance a causal mechanism for demobilization that is different from either cooptation 
or polarization.  I suggest that protest campaigns can demobilize because of critical events that 
constrain the leadership’s protest strategies.  Critical events are important turning points that 
affect public and elite attention to campaigns (Staggenborg 1993:320).  
Scholars have examined critical events in different contexts in political science. For 
instance, several International Relations scholars have studied the impact of critical events, or 
shocks in the de-escalation or termination of strategic rivalries (Goertz and Diehl 1995, 
Rasler,Thompson and Ganguly 2013).  While critical events are not sufficient to terminate or de-
escalate rivalries, they can contribute to a process of de-escalation of rivalries when political 
leaders take advantage of the uncertainty caused by the disruption of routine expectations 
(Rasler, et al. 2013:13-19).  Scholars of Historical Institutionalism also have sought to 
understand institutional change via critical junctures (Collier and Collier 2002, Mahoney 2001, 
Polanyi 1957).  Critical junctures relax structural influences (economic, cultural, organizational, 
and ideological) on political action significantly for a short period of time, widening the options 
available to political actors.  The consequences of powerful actors’ decisions during critical 
junctures typically have long term consequences (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).  Both strands of 
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research, however, mostly emphasize the relaxation of structural constraints and the widening of 
political options, rather than structural changes that narrow the options available to political 
actors.  
 While studies of protest campaigns have examined the escalatory impact of critical events 
(Rasler 1996, Shawki 2012), with the notable exception of Staggenborg (1993), few scholars 
have provided theoretical guidelines as to how to identify critical events. Staggenborg suggests 
six types of critical events based on the extent of control the actors exert: large-scale 
socioeconomic and political events, natural disasters and epidemics, accidents, critical 
encounters, strategic initiatives, and policy outcomes (Staggenborg 1993:322).  Large-scale 
socioeconomic and political events such as wars and depressions; natural disasters and 
epidemics; and industrial or nuclear accidents are critical events which neither campaign actors 
nor their opponents exert much control over.  In contrast, strategic initiatives and policy 
outcomes are orchestrated by the campaign actors or their opponents.  In strategic initiatives, 
campaign actors or the counter-campaign create events designed to mobilize support.  Policy 
outcomes are official state responses to mobilization.  States might adopt favorable or 
unfavorable policies that affect levels of support for campaigns.    
 Critical encounters, which the communal violence in Assam falls into, are events that 
involve face-to-face interactions or physical contact between authorities or other actors who are 
somewhat associated with the campaign.  Such events occur when other social actors attempt to 
assert control using methods ranging from ridicule to violence, causing a sudden change in the 
trajectory of the campaign (Staggenborg 1993:327-28).  Staggenborg argues that the level of 
control in critical encounters ranges from full control by the state or campaign leaders to little or 
no control.  Thus, critical encounters might include events that occur during the campaign with 
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the full knowledge and sanctioning of the elites or campaign leaders as well as events that are 
unauthorized or not approved by them.  The shootings of the two police officers in New York 
during the Black Lives Matter campaign in the United States, for instance, happened within the 
context of the campaign but were not sanctioned by the elites or the campaign leaders.  Similarly, 
in Assam, the killings of the mostly Muslim peasants by Assamese villagers during the protest 
campaign were critical encounters that were beyond the campaign leadership’s control.  While 
the campaign leaders had called for a boycott of the 1983 State Assembly elections that 
increased violence associated with protests in major towns, the violent attacks in rural areas were 
not controlled by the leaders of the Assam protest campaign (Kimura 2013:7).  Therefore, the 
communal violence in Assam is distinct from the protest campaign in the sense that neither the 
protesters nor the campaign or the state leadership planned it.  Nonetheless, the communal 
violence occurred in rural areas when ethnic tension was significantly elevated in the region.  
 
The Causal Mechanism 
In societies where communal divisions are salient, opposition leaders broaden the base of 
resistance to include members of different ethnic groups.  Nonetheless, the inclusion of different 
ethnic groups makes the unity of the campaign precarious particularly if campaign activities 
highlight ethnic cleavages (Horowitz 2001, Svensson and Lindgren 2011).  Mass actions can 
exacerbate tensions by provoking fear or anger between different communal groups.  When an 
ethnic group demonstrates strength by protesting in large numbers, others feel threatened 
especially if the protesters’ claims have ethnic overtones.  In such instances, protest campaigns 
become highly combustible, increasing the chances of communal violence.  For instance, Uzbek 
demonstrations over ethnic claims to land and housing led to communal violence in Kyrgyzstan 
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in 1990.  Similarly, the Azeri protests against Armenian demands for the unification of Karabakh 
with Armenia triggered communal violence, resulting in mass killings of Armenians (Horowitz 
2001, Varshney 2002).  
Although communal violence occurs outside the control of the protest leadership, it can 
dramatically affect the trajectory of the campaign.  Opposition elites face pressure to shut down 
the campaign to prevent more ethnic violence.  Moreover, protesters that are members of the 
ethnic groups targeted during the violence withdraw their support from the campaign as a result 
of the increased prominence of ethnic allegiances.  The leaders also face the challenge of finding 
ways to reinvigorate enthusiasm and maintain solidarity particularly when political elites or the 
media call for a slowdown to give the communities time to heal.  Even if the campaign resumes, 
the loss of momentum leads to a decline in protest activity and lower levels of support.  A 
striking example is the collapse of the civil disobedience campaign in India as a result of Hindu-
Muslim violence in the early 1920s.  As the British were fighting against the Ottoman sultan 
during World War I, the Muslims in India turned against the British, providing Gandhi the 
opportunity to unite Hindus and Muslims in a civil disobedience campaign for the freedom of 
India.  Even though Muslim-Hindu unity was created for some time, in mid-1921, Muslim 
clerics in Malabar in the state of Kerala started to protest against the British treatment of the 
caliph in Turkey.  These protests first turned into a violent rebellion against the British, and then 
degenerated into Hindu-Muslim violence (Varshney 2002:142), creating a Hindu-Muslim divide 
within the Indian national movement across the country.  Gandhi and the Congress Party were 
unable to maintain the campaign as communal divisions became too obvious.  Consequently, 
Gandhi ended the campaign in 1922 and the Congress Party withdrew from mass mobilization 
until 1929  (Varshney 2002:134-35). 
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Communal violence leading to the demobilization of a protest campaign differs from 
previously identified causal pathways in the literature.  For Piven and Cloward (1977) and 
Tarrow (1989), the broadening of the support base leaves campaigns vulnerable to internal 
divisions, resulting in a withdrawal of support, and finally, demobilization.  However, the factors 
that trigger the withdrawal of public support are different.  According to Piven and Cloward 
(1977), the expansion of the protest campaign prompts the government to coopt the opposition to 
channel their disruptive behavior into organized forms of contention.  Yet, campaign leaders 
usually overestimate their ability to keep the campaign strong and effective via organizations 
while simultaneously underestimating the amount of resources needed to maintain an 
organization.  As leaders get isolated from the protesters, disruptive behavior declines, leaving 
the remaining agitated protesters discouraged and vulnerable to repression.   
Alternatively, Tarrow (1989) highlights the competitive dynamics among groups and its 
potential to lead to internal divisions before governments can coopt campaign leaders.  When 
protest campaigns first emerge, disruptive protests diffuse to different locations and segments of 
the society.  Competition for mass support intensifies as both established groups, such as trade 
unions or political parties, and new groups join the campaign.  Nonetheless, the early enthusiasm 
for protesting wanes over time and the personal costs of participation wear people down.  The 
decline in participation further encourages competition for mass support.  While moderates lead 
the shift toward conventional forms of collective action such as strikes and demonstrations, 
smaller and newer groups turn radical as they employ violent tactics to distinguish themselves 
from the moderates.  Similar to Piven and Cloward’s (1977) cooptation model, the state represses 
the radicals selectively while accommodating the moderates, reinforcing the polarization 
between these groups.  Faced with repression, the radicals resort to more violent tactics, resulting 
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in a further withdrawal of public support.  The split between the moderates and the radicals 
eventually leads to the demise of the protest campaign (Tarrow 1989).   
The causal mechanism I offer, however, allows for a disruption of the trajectory of 
protests by an unexpected and unorchestrated event.  As Figure 1 illustrates, if a critical event 
such as communal violence occurs in an ethnically divided society, the campaign leadership 
refrains from employing strategies that might exacerbate ethnic tensions. Governing elites 
usually assert their authority and criticize campaign leaders for mobilizing ethnic political 
demands and bringing ethnic issues to the forefront.  In addition, political elites often pressure 
campaign leaders to suspend their activities in a highly tense ethnic and political environment to 
prevent the outbreak of more violence.  As Horowitz (2001:286) suggests, ethnic groups can be 
provoked more easily to engage in large scale violence during mass demonstrations or 
processions, particularly if the core issues closely relate to ethnic demands.  Given the elevated 
tension as well as the political elite’s pressure in the aftermath of communal violence, campaign 
leaders will typically avoid organizing protests.   
Furthermore, as communal violence highlights the divisions within the society, ethnic 
groups, particularly those that have been victimized by the violence, withdraw their support from 
the protest campaign as it becomes more difficult to act collectively across ethnic lines. When 
the protest campaign secures the support of different ethnic, religious, and/or socioeconomic 
groups, protest leaders face challenges in keeping these different groups together after a major 
shock like communal violence.  If one of the groups included in this broad coalition has 
affiliations to the group that has been targeted, campaign solidarity declines. The group affiliated 
to the victims questions the purpose of the campaign and pressures the leaders to modify 
campaign policies that undermine the interests of the targeted groups. Other groups also make 
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demands to strengthen their profile, further undermining the campaign’s broad coalition. Thus, 
the ability of the leaders to organize mass events decreases. Furthermore, the leaders spend more 
time and energy into finding ways to re-energize the campaign and rebuild solidarity.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 Causal Pathway for the Demobilization of a Protest Campaign 
 
Assam and the Anti-Foreigner Protest Campaign, 1979-1985 
Assam is an ethnically heterogeneous society which has also witnessed large scale 
immigration from many parts of the subcontinent (particularly East Bengal) over the last hundred 
years (Baruah 1986).  According to the 1971 census records (before the anti-foreigner protest 
campaign started in 1979) 72.5% of the population in Assam was Hindu, 24.6% was Muslim, 
and 2.61% was Christian.  The Muslim population in Assam includes ethnic Assamese and 
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Muslims of Bengali descent while Hindus also include ethnic Assamese and Hindu Bengalis that 
immigrated to Assam.  People are divided along linguistic lines, which, simultaneously also 
stands for the division between “indigenous” and “immigrant” groups.  As of 1971, 
approximately 68% of the population in Assam spoke languages or dialects that are considered to 
be of “indigenous” people while 29 % of the population spoke “immigrant” languages or dialects 
(Baruah 1986:1188). 
 The protest campaign in Assam emerged to drive out both Hindu and Muslim 
immigrants (Kimura 2013).  Threatened by rapid population growth following a large influx of 
Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh and concerned by the growing political power of the 
middle-class mostly Hindu Bengali immigrants, ethnic Assamese started a state-wide protest 
campaign in 1979 to pressure the Indian Government to identify illegal immigrants, delete their 
names from voting lists, and deport them to Bangladesh.  The campaign was led by the All 
Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), an 
umbrella organization formed in 1979 to direct the protest activities against illegal immigrants 
(Baruah 1999).  While the campaign leaders demanded the deportation of all those who entered 
after 1951, the Indian state felt a humanitarian commitment toward the Hindu refugees who 
crossed into India from East Pakistan to escape the atrocities of the Pakistani state before it 
became Bangladesh in 1971.  Therefore, the Indian Government insisted that 1971 should be the 
baseline year, allowing foreigners who entered before that year to stay (Kimura 2013).  
The campaign gained mass support among ethnic Assamese, including indigenous 
Muslims who had settled in Assam before colonization.  The leaders of the campaign made a 
deliberate attempt to frame the immigration issue along secular lines by highlighting the 
illegality of it rather than identifying certain ethnic immigrants, especially the Muslims, as the 
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unwanted population (Baruah 1986, Kimura 2013).  Thousands of students, government 
employees, peasants and workers participated in demonstrations, strikes, and sit-ins throughout 
the first four years.  The government responded with a mix of repression and accommodation as 
it used force against the protesters at times while also periodically negotiating with the campaign 
leaders.  In early 1983, the campaign intensified in the wake of the state legislative assembly 
elections scheduled for February.  The central government insisted on using the electoral rolls of 
1979 without deleting the names of foreigners while the campaign leaders strongly opposed and 
called for an electoral boycott.  Both nonviolent and violent protests intensified before the 
elections as many Assamese citizens supported the boycott.  In addition to the strikes aimed at 
preventing election preparations and the filing of nominations, the AASU and the AAGSP 
organized a general strike that was supported by state employees.  As clashes between the police 
and the protesters increased, the Assam government brought in additional police from other 
states.  In the midst of this tense political environment, communal violence occurred when 
Assamese and Tiwa (an indigenous minority group) peasants in the rural areas attacked mostly 
Muslims of Bengali descent (Kimura 2013).  The first large-scale ethnic violence took place in 
the Darrang District on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra River on February 11.  One week 
later, about 1,600 to 2,000 Muslims of East Bengali origin were killed in several villages around 
Nellie in the Nagaon District (Kimura 2013:68).  According to Kimura (2013), the Nellie 
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incident was one of the largest incidents of ethnic violence in India’s rural areas since India 
gained its independence in 1947.4  
After the communal violence, the AASU and AAGSP suspended the campaign for a few 
months, resuming protest activities in August 1983.  Yet, protest activity remained at 
dramatically lower levels after the ethnic violence of 1983.  As a result of extensive negotiations, 
the campaign leaders and the Indian Government signed the Assam Accord in August 1985, both 
agreeing to disenfranchise all the foreigners that entered Assam between 1966 and 1971 for ten 
years and deporting those that came after 1971 (Baruah 1999).  Figure 2 illustrates the trajectory 
of the protest campaign and the occurrence of communal violence in Assam in 1983.5 
 
                                                          
4 Smaller scale communal violence in 1980 in Assam is not considered as a critical event as it did 
not change the overall trajectory of the protest campaign. See Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) for 
a discussion of identification of critical events.  
5 This figure is generated by using the count of events.  
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FIGURE 2  Weekly Protest Activity Before and After Communal Violence in Assam 
 
Assam as a “Least Likely” Case 
Assam is an ideal case to examine the effects of communal violence on a protest 
campaign because it is a “least likely” case, meaning that it is harder to prove the argument as 
opposed to a case that easily fits the argument (George and Bennett 2005).  First and foremost, 
communal violence took place in the spring of 1983, but the campaign ended in August 1985, 
more than two years later.  In most other instances, communal violence ends protest campaigns 
rather abruptly, as in the case of the Tamil protests against the declaration of Sinhalese as the 
sole official language in Sri Lanka in 1958 (DeVotta 2004).  In Assam, though, protests actually 
resumed a few months after communal violence and continued intermittently for two more years.  
Therefore, demonstrating the demobilizing effects of communal violence is more challenging in 
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the Assam case.  Moreover, the campaign in Assam was well-established since 1979, long before 
the ethnic violence took place.  Protests were organized regularly and were usually well attended.  
A strong campaign like the one in Assam should be less vulnerable to the negative effects of 
communal violence than other more ad hoc campaigns like the one in Nigeria after the re-
election of Goodluck Jonathan in 2011.  Therefore, a demonstration of the decline in protest 
activity as a result of communal violence in Assam should provide strong support for the 
demobilizing effect of ethnic violence in the context of ongoing protest campaigns.  
 
Research Design 
Data6 
The analysis is based on data collected from The Indian Express, a national daily 
newspaper, from January 1, 1979 to August 16, 1985.  The data set covers both nonviolent and 
violent forms of protest action such as demonstrations, strikes and clashes with the police, as 
well as incidents of communal violence.7  Events were coded for the date, actor, location, target, 
number of participants, number of injured and number of deaths.8  The state’s repressive and 
accommodative actions were also coded for the same time period.  Events that lacked 
information on the exact date, actor, and type of action were omitted from the data set.  In total, 
                                                          
6 The codebook used for this data set is posted in the Appendix. 
7 Ethnic violence is distinguishable from protest violence as communal violence occurred in rural 
areas whereas protest activity typically took place in major cities. Ambiguous cases were 
excluded.  
8 Ambiguous events were excluded. 
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8,488 events9 were hand coded by the author10 based on a list of events compiled mostly from 
Krain (2000) and Moore and Lindstrom’s (1996) Violent International Conflict Data Project 
(VICD) and weighted by a scale that is based on Krain’s (2000) scale for opposition and state 
actions ranging from 1 to 25.11  A detailed explanation of the weighting scheme and its 
modification of Krain’s scale can be found in the Appendix.  The data were then aggregated in 
weekly intervals. 
The underrepresentation of the frequency of the actual events, the overreporting of 
violent events and the selective reporting of events are three obvious issues that could potentially 
challenge the validity of the data as a consequence of coding from a single newspaper.  In terms 
of underrepresentation, The Indian Express had correspondents based in Assam throughout the 
protest campaign directly reporting from the area and providing detailed information regarding a 
wide range of collective actions, thus reducing the chance of underrepresentation.  Moreover, the 
data illustrate similar trends to those found by scholars who have studied the anti-foreigner 
protest campaign and communal violence in Assam (Baruah 1999, Kimura 2013), somewhat 
minimizing concerns over validity.  Regarding the issue of overreporting violence and 
underreporting nonviolence (Day,Pinckney and Chenoweth 2015), I used secondary sources 
                                                          
9 Every action of every actor was coded separately.  For instance, if students shouted slogans and 
threw stones, two separate actions were coded. Clashes are coded for both protesters and the 
police. 
10 Since only one coder was involved, potential issues of inter-coder reliability do not arise. 
11 The correlation coefficients for all variables between the number of events and the weighted 
data range from .87 to .98.  
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(Baruah 1986, Baruah 1999, Kimura 2013) to check the accuracy of the reporting whenever 
possible.  Nonetheless, given the media attention on Assam and the protesters after the mass 
killings, underreporting of nonviolence seems unlikely.  Finally, selective reporting of events 
might introduce bias to the data because reporters do not (and cannot) report every single 
collective action that occurs in the public domain.  Therefore, they are left to make decisions 
regarding what to report and how much detail to present.  The concern is that newspapers report 
events that are likely to attract more attention and underreport minor events, thus, disregarding 
the vast majority of contentious activity (McCarthy,McPhail and Smith 1996).  Nonetheless, 
others have argued that selective reporting is an issue when and where protests occur frequently.  
In locations like Assam in the late 1970s, when protests were less frequent, they are more 
newsworthy and receive greater coverage (Earl,Martin,McCarthy and Soule 2004:71).  
Moreover, the longitudinal design of the study reduces potential challenges to the internal 
validity of the analyses since selective reporting would be an issue both before and after the 
communal violence.  
 
Model and Estimation 
To understand the effect of communal violence on protest activity, I conduct a single 
group time series analysis that is commonly used in epidemiology, which compares a pre-
intervention time series with a post-intervention time series (Linden and Adams 2011).  
Accordingly, I model communal violence as an “intervention” on the protest activity series, the 
dependent variable, to examine two types of changes in protest activity: the immediate change in 
protest activity right after the first occurrences of communal violence and the long term change 
in the trajectory of protest activity until the end of the campaign.  
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Protest activity, the dependent variable, is the total weekly score of nonviolent and 
violent forms of collective action including demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and arson.  The 
minimum values of protest typically reflect the weeks when protesters use few nonviolent 
tactics; while the maximum values reflect the weeks when protesters resort to nonviolent tactics 
more frequently and/or resort to violent tactics such as clashing with the police.  Hence, the 
demobilization phase represents the period before the end of the campaign when the values of 
the dependent variable are declining, indicating that protesters used both nonviolent and violent 
forms of tactics less frequently.  
To assess the changes of the communal violence on protest activity, I construct a time 
variable denoting the number of weeks from the start of the campaign until its end.  The 
coefficient of this variable represents the trajectory of protest activity until the communal 
violence begins.  The intervention variable is a dummy variable coded 1 for the weeks the 
communal violence are on (weeks 7 to 12 in 1983) and 0 otherwise.  The coefficient of 
intervention is the intercept at the time when communal violence occurs and indicates any 
immediate changes in protest activity right after the communal violence.  Finally, a post-
intervention time variable is constructed to denote the number of weeks after the communal 
violence.  The coefficient of this variable represents the change in the slope of protest activity.  If 
the communal violence indeed has a demobilizing effect, then the coefficients of either 
intervention or post-intervention time, or both should be negative and have significant p values.  
A significant negative coefficient for intervention would signify a sudden drop in protest activity 
and a significant, negative slope after intervention would suggest a decay, which could be steep 
or gradual, depending on the slope.  
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I also control for state actions as both repression and accommodation have the potential 
to affect protest activity.  While several studies have shown that repression increases protest 
activity by creating a backfire effect (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Francisco 1995, Rasler 
1996), others have found that carefully targeted and consistent repression is likely to demobilize 
protesters (Beissinger 2002, Tarrow 1989).  Repression is the total weekly score of repressive 
actions carried out by the lower level authorities, typically the police, directly confronting the 
protesters, such as blocking the roads; as well as those sanctioned by higher level authorities 
including the imposition of curfews or restrictions on civil liberties.  
Similarly, the state’s accommodative tactics can have a positive or negative effect on 
protests.  Accommodation can increase protest activity as it signals weakness (Rasler 1996); or it 
can lead to a decline in protests as it creates splits between the moderates and the radicals 
(Tarrow 1989) or coopts the protesters (Piven and Cloward 1977).  Accommodation is measured 
as the total weekly score of state concessions that include actions like negotiations, removing 
restrictive laws and regulations, or withdrawing the army from the region.12 
I estimate both a Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression (ZINB) and a Poisson 
autoregressive (PAR) model of order (p) to examine the effects of communal violence on the 
protest campaign.  Both ZINB and PAR are count models that are appropriate for the nature of 
the dependent variable in this analysis.  A ZINB analysis is appropriate for count models that are 
overdispersed13 and have a high number of zero observations of the dependent variable (Long 
                                                          
12 Descriptive statistics for the variables can be found in the Appendix. 
13 The variance of protest activity is greater than its mean, indicating overdispersion. 
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1997).14  The data are also ordered in time, meaning that past values influence future values.15 As 
Brandt et al (2000) show, estimating event counts that are time dependent with a standard count 
model might lead to inefficient estimates.  The systematic dynamics of the data have to be taken 
into account while working with time series event count data such as the series on the Assam 
protest campaign, which a PAR analysis is able to do. The PAR model is suitable for cyclical 
and short-memoried processes that are mean reverting (Brandt and Williams 2001).  As Figure 2 
demonstrates, the protest activity series has a cyclical pattern as the peaks in the series are 
followed by declines.  The plot for the Autocorrelation Function (ACF) of the series (Figure 3) 
shows autocorrelation only in the first four lags indicating that the process has a short-term 
memory.  Therefore, I use the PAR model developed by Brandt and Williams (2001) to account 
for the time-series nature of the data and a ZINB to deal with the high frequency of zero 
observations.  
                                                          
14 Vuong test statistics indicate that ZINB is preferable to a regular negative binomial.  
15 A transfer function model assessing the impact of intervention on a time series is not suitable 
as the data are based on event counts (Brandt and Williams 2001). 
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FIGURE 3  Autocorrelation Function Plot for Protest Activity 
 
Findings  
Table 1 shows the results of the ZINB and PAR (2)16 analyses for the protest activity in 
Assam between January 1979 and August 1985.17  The Critical Event Model with the single 
                                                          
16 The AR parameters in larger lags were insignificant.  
17 The same analyses were conducted on the unweighted data and the results are similar.  Also, 
the Critical Event Model was run on nonviolent and violent protest activity separately. Overall, 
the results still confirm the findings of the Critical Event Model.  The short-term positive impact 
of communal violence on violent protests can perhaps be explained due to the radicals’ initial 
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group analysis controlling for repression and accommodation suggests that protest activity 
decreased significantly when communal violence began in the middle of February 1983.  Both 
intervention and post intervention are statistically significant (p<.001 and p<.05 respectively) in 
the ZINB analysis.  The PAR results are also similar as both variables significantly decrease 
protest activity, indicating that protest activity declined immediately after communal violence 
began and continued to decline in its aftermath. 
 
TABLE 1 ZINB and PAR Estimates of Protest Activity in Assam 
 
Variable 
 
Critical Event Model 
 
Protest Violence 
Model 
 
Pre-Communal 
Violence Model 
 
Post-Communal 
Violence Model 
 ZINB PAR ZINB PAR ZINB PAR ZINB PAR 
Time   0.001 
 (0.002) 
  0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.006** 
 (0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Intervention 
(Communal 
Violence) 
-2.774*** 
 (0.657) 
-2.090*** 
 (0.529) 
 -1.598** 
 (0.491) 
-1.054† 
(0.621) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Post-Intervention  -0.015* 
 (0.006) 
-0.036*** 
(0.006) 
  0.006 
 (0.006) 
-0.018** 
(0.006) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Repression  
 
  0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
  0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
 
0.003***
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 0.004 
(0.003) 
 0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Accommodation  -0.012 
 (0.009) 
-0.033*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.009  
 (0.008) 
-0.019** 
(0.007) 
 0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.014†
 
(0.007)
 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.042) 
High violence 
 
 
     - 
 
     - 
  0.003** 
 (0.001) 
 0.001  
(0.001) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
    - 
 
    - 
Constant  4.112*** 
(0.311) 
 3.003*** 
(0.246) 
  4.896*** 
 (2.502) 
 3.506** 
(0.205) 
4.379***
(0.205) 
3.925*** 
(0.129) 
 3.727*** 
(0.195) 
 2.325*** 
(0.242) 
AR parameter 1 
(lag one) 
 
     - 
 0.573*** 
(0.055) 
     
      - 
    
0.529***
(0.056) 
 
-  
  0.670*** 
 (0.071) 
   
- 
 0.440** 
(0.090) 
AR parameter 2 
(lag two) 
 
     - 
-0.123** 
(0.041) 
  
      -    
-0.084† 
(0.051) 
      
- 
 -0.081 
 (0.051) 
 
- 
 0.008 
(0.087) 
N    345     343 345 343 215 213     125   123 
Probability>chi-
square 
  
  0.000 
 
      - 
 
0.000 
 
- 
 
0.000 
 
- 
 
  0.106 
 
     - 
Adjusted R2      -    0.56 -   0.54 -    0.57  -   0.29 
† p<.10, *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; All significant tests are two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses 
                                                          
desire to show their continued determination to carry on.  The results of robustness checks can be 
found in the Appendix. 
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These findings confirm that the communal violence led to a sudden drop in protest 
activity and continued to stifle the campaign until the Assam Accord was signed in August 1985.  
Table 2 illustrates the factor changes in the rate of protest activity for a clear interpretation of the 
coefficients.  Accordingly, protest activity decreases by a factor of 0.06 after the communal 
violence begins, and continues to decline by a factor of 0.99 after the communal violence is over.  
 
TABLE 2 Factor Change in Expected Rate of Protest Activity18 
 
  
Critical Event 
Model 
 
Protest 
Violence Model 
 
Pre-Communal 
Violence Model 
 
Post-Communal 
Violence Model 
 
Time 
 
- 
 
-0.99 
  
Intervention (Communal 
Violence) 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.20 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Post-Intervention 
 
-0.99 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Repression 
 
1.01 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
- 
 
Accommodation 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 0.98  
 
- 
 
High Violence 
 
- 
 
1.00 
  
 
 
 
The Critical Event Model also shows that repression leads to an increase in protest 
activity in both the ZINB and PAR analyses suggesting the existence of a backfire effect 
(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, Francisco 1995, Rasler 1996).  This effect is relatively strong, as 
repression increases protest activity by a factor of 1.01, holding other variables constant (Table 
2).  This finding is particularly interesting because it suggests that the campaign continued to 
demobilize despite the backfire effect of repression.  Accommodation has a significant and 
                                                          
18 Only the expected rates of significant coefficients are listed 
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negative effect only in the PAR analysis.  The negative impact of accommodation indicates that, 
independent of communal violence, accommodative actions might have contributed to the 
demobilization of the protest campaign, confirming Piven and Cloward’s cooptation model or 
Tarrow’s polarization model.  To understand the effects of accommodation and repression more 
precisely, I examine the impact of these variables on protest activity during the pre- and post-
intervention phases in Models 3 and 4 respectively.     
In the Protest Violence Model, I control for high levels of protest violence as previous 
studies have shown that heavy protest violence leads to the demobilization of a campaign as 
participation declines when violence erupts and polarization between the radicals and the 
moderates occurs (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, della Porta and Tarrow 1986, Tarrow 1989). 19 
For this model only, I construct a new dependent variable for protests that does not include 
heavy violence and create a new control variable, high violence representing acts such as 
abductions, armed attacks, and clashes with security forces that occur during the protest 
                                                          
19 Although studies have demonstrated that elections are associated with high levels of violence 
(Dunning 2011), elections did not have a significant impact on protest activity. Parliamentary 
elections in December 1979 and the State Assembly elections in February 1983 were the only 
two elections held in Assam during the time period under study. The 1984 parliamentary 
elections were postponed and held in December 1985. A dummy variable coded 1 for three 
months before and after each election was statistically insignificant in the ZINB estimates of the 
Critical Event Model.  
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campaign.20 The results of the ZINB and PAR analyses suggest that high violence is significant, 
but in the opposite direction. High violence does not seem to deter protests in Assam, and 
instead, increases it by a factor of 1.00 (Table 2).  Thus, the Protest Violence Model shows that 
high levels of violence during the elections was not the cause of the demobilization of the 
campaign.  The heavy violence in Assam was primarily associated with the protesters’ election 
boycott as anti-election groups, mostly ethnic Assamese, tried to intimidate pro-election groups 
(mostly Bengalis) from participating (Baruah 1999, Kimura 2013).   
  The Pre- and Post-Communal Violence models examine the effects of state actions 
before and after communal violence respectively to understand if state policies had differential 
effects across the two time periods. For instance, Indian leaders could have been more inclined to 
make concessions to the protesters after ethnic violence began to alleviate the tension in the 
region.  Alternatively, the leaders might have resorted to more repressive measures in order to 
crush the protesters and bring order to Assam.  Both ZINB and PAR analyses show that 
repression has a positive and significant effect on protest activity during the pre- and post-
communal violence periods, suggesting that the effect of repression remained relatively 
consistent across the protest campaign.  Accommodation has no significant effect in the pre and 
post-intervention period, indicating that the negotiations between the Indian government and the 
campaign leaders, and the attempts to coopt the opposition did not demobilize the campaign.  As 
Figure 1 also shows, protest activity had already declined dramatically when the parties agreed to 
participate in the last round of negotiations, which started in April 1985, almost two years after 
                                                          
20 The full range of events are listed under the High Intensity Collective Action category in the 
Codebook posted in the Appendix. 
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the ethnic killings took place.  Thus, neither model suggests that sate actions led to the decline in 
protest activity. 
Predictive margins generated based on the ZINB analysis of the Critical Event Model 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the effect of the communal violence on protest activity 
(Figure 4).  The predicted number of weekly protest events declines steadily over the course of 
time. As Figure 4 illustrates, the predicted number of protest events is 60 immediately after the 
communal violence. About six months later, however, the number of protest events goes down to 
40, and in about a year, the number is below 30, indicating a more than 50% decrease in protest 
activity. In approximately two years after the communal violence, the predicted number of 
protest events further declines to slightly above ten a week.  When these numbers are put into 
context, the first year in particular seems quite significant. One year after the communal 
violence, none of the issues the protesters were campaigning on had been resolved and the 
leaders of the campaign were still trying to mobilize support. So, a more than 50% decline in the 
first year suggests that the communal violence had a significant effect on the demobilization of 
the campaign.  
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FIGURE 4 Predicted number of Events after the Communal Violence 
 
To evaluate the predictive power of the Critical Event Model, I generated out-of-sample 
forecasting, which is an ideal tool for cross-validation.  The main idea is to compare the 
predicted values generated by the model to the observed values.21  Moreover, these forecasts can 
be easily compared to those of other models.  Since polarization did not occur in the Assam case, 
forecasts on a polarization model  (Tarrow 1989) cannot be tested. 22  However, because the 
                                                          
21 Generating predicted values of observations that are not included in any of the analyses is 
another option for cross validation.  
22 The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), a separatist insurgent group, was established 
in 1979 but did not actively challenge the state until the late 1980s. 
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Indian government used accommodative tactics to coopt the protesters, I am able to generate out-
of-sample forecasts based on a Cooptation Model that has the accommodation variable only 
(Piven and Cloward 1977) and compare them to the out-of-sample forecasts of the Critical Event 
Model.  
To obtain the out-of-sample forecasts, I first run ZINB regressions to estimate the 
parameters for both models by holding back the weeks after the communal violence ends.23  
Based on these estimates, I then generate out-of-sample probabilities of protest activity for the 
period after the critical event and calculate Theil’s U to evaluate the predictive power of each 
model.  Theil’s U is a ratio where the numerator is the sum of squared prediction errors and the 
denominator is the sum of squared prediction error from a naïve model, which expects no change 
from one observation to the other (Farnum and Stanton 1989:26).  Values below one indicate a 
better performance of the statistical model compared to the naïve model.   
The plots in Figure 4 illustrate the number of observed protest events and the out-of-
sample predictions based on the Critical Event and the Cooptation Models after the intervention. 
Even though neither one of the models predict protest activity very accurately, the Critical Event 
Model performs much better than the Cooptation Model. 24 The Theil’s U statistics for the 
Critical Event and the Cooptation Models are 0.99 and 3.36 respectively, indicating that although 
neither greatly outperforms the naïve model, the Critical Event Model is still a better predictor of 
                                                          
23 I hold back the weeks after June 1983, approximately 33% of the observations, after the 
communal violence. These estimates can be found in the Appendix. 
24 The AIC scores for the Critical Event and Cooptation models are 1427.15 and 1535.25 
respectively. 
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protest activity during the demobilization period.  As Figure 4 shows, the Cooptation Model 
predicts higher values of protest activity while the Critical Event Model predicts no activity 
during the demobilization period.25 
 
 
FIGURE 5 Out-of-sample Forecasts for the Critical Event and Cooptation Models 
 
Overall, the empirical analyses show that the communal violence in February 1983 led to 
the demobilization of the protest campaign.  Until the communal violence, the campaign was 
                                                          
25 The Critical Event plot suggests that the variables present in the model are not sensitive 
enough to protest activity occurrence to be able to detect those spikes. This might be due to the 
inability of the model to account for the autoregressive component of the series.  
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strong and had most of the characteristics identified by scholars of nonviolent resistance as likely 
to lead to a successful outcome.  First, the campaign started off by employing nonviolent tactics 
and secured substantive mass support from ethnic Assamese as well as from non-immigrant 
Muslims, the most important factor for pressuring the government to change its unfavorable 
policies according to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).  The campaign leaders mobilized 
thousands of people, including students, teachers, peasants, state government officials and oil 
workers and brought them out into the streets.  For instance, in November 1979, nearly two 
million people Assam participated in the civil disobedience campaign (Baruah 1999).  Second, 
the high level of participation allowed for tactical innovation throughout the first four years, 
increasing the campaign’s resilience in the face of state repression (Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011, McAdam 1983, Schock 2005).  For instance, in late December 1979, shortly after 
launching a civil disobedience campaign, the protesters imposed an economic blockade, stopping 
the transportation of crude oil, plywood, and jute from Assam to the rest of the country (Indian 
Express, December 30, 1979).  Moreover, many state police and government officials supported 
the campaign against illegal immigrants, dramatically reducing the level of repression used 
against the protesters (Kimura 2013).  According to Nepstad (2011) and Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011), such loyalty shifts are crucial for the success of a campaign.  Finally, potentially more 
radical supporters of the campaign did not have a violent insurgent group to turn to (Chenoweth 
and Stephan 2011), keeping the mass support for the campaign relatively intact.  In short, the 
protest campaign in Assam featured several mechanisms that should have enabled the leaders to 
continue to mobilize people and put pressure on the government before communal violence 
began. 
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So, how exactly did the communal violence set the demobilization process of the 
campaign in motion?  Communal violence turned into a critical event that significantly limited 
the campaign leader’s available strategies.  After the extent of the violence became known, 
members of the Indian central government repeatedly called for peace and calm in the region 
(The Indian Express, February 22 & March 15, 1983) while political actors and civil society 
groups offered competing explanations for the occurrence of such brutal violence.  The campaign 
leaders blamed the Indian Government for imposing the elections without changing the electoral 
rolls (Kimura 2013) whereas several members of the government accused the protesters of 
inciting violence in the region.  For instance, right after the most publicized mass killings in 
Nellie on February 18, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi publicly blamed the protest leaders for the 
violence in Assam (The Indian Express, February 22, 1983).  The campaign leadership was also 
criticized for their failure to condemn violence immediately after the communal violence started 
(Gandhi 1983). When the temporary suspension of the campaign was finally announced in late 
March, the leaders emphasized the need to focus on relief, rehabilitation, and integration (The 
Indian Express, March 28, 1983).  Even though protests resumed in August 1983, the intensity of 
the campaign decreased dramatically (Figure 2). 
The communal violence further entrenched ethnic divisions within the society alienating 
ethnic Assamese and immigrant Muslims (Gupta 1983). The tension among these two groups 
had important consequences for the campaign.  After the extensive killings of Muslim peasants, 
many Muslim protesters withdrew their support, including those who had settled before 
colonization and, hence, were seen as indigenous.  For instance, one of the top Muslim student 
leaders resigned from his position after the occurrence of communal violence (Kimura 2013).  
Consequently, the campaign leaders had to devote considerable time and resources into 
34 
 
addressing internal divisions.  Several Muslim members of the AASU issued an ultimatum to the 
AASU leadership demanding a correction in what they perceived as a pro-Hindu communal tilt 
(Baruah 1999). Similarly, several other indigenous groups, such as the Bodos, began to make 
demands that emphasized their distinctiveness from ethnic Assamese.  In January and December 
1984, the AASU organized two separate national conventions to address the rifts among such 
groups by emphasizing the urgent need to provide a unified political platform (Baruah 1999). 
While the lack of primary sources makes it impossible to pinpoint which of these two causal 
mechanisms (the leaders backing off versus withdrawal of support) is more important, the 
secondary sources clearly demonstrate the role of communal violence in the demobilization 
process.  
 Two significant concessions by the central government in New Delhi led to the end of the 
protest campaign.  First, in 1984, the Election Commission of India decided that the electoral 
rolls in Assam were to be revised based on the 1971 electoral rolls, which meant that the 
immigrants who entered after 1971 would be disenfranchised (The Indian Express, July 13, 
1984).  The campaign leaders saw the Election Commission’s decision as a confidence building 
measure as many illegal immigrants who settled in Assam after the creation of Bangladesh in 
1971 would be disenfranchised. Second, the Indian government left the state government out of 
the negotiations, recognizing the power of the campaign leaders, who insisted that the current 
government was not elected by the people of Assam in 1983 as many ethnic Assamese boycotted 
the elections (Baruah 1999).  Therefore, they argued, the state government was illegitimate and 
should not participate in any discussions (Narayan 1985).  
 In early 1985, the lack of enthusiasm for continued protests was already evident.  Many 
Assamese defied the campaign leaders’ call to boycott the Republic Day celebrations in early 
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1985 by joining them in the main stadium in Guwahati (The Indian Express, May 8, 1985).  The 
final round of negotiations between the campaign leaders and the central government began in 
April 1985, and the Assam Accord was eventually signed on August 15, 1985.  Accordingly, all 
foreigners who had entered between 1966 and 1971 would be disenfranchised for ten years and 
those who had entered after 1971 would be deported.  The current state government would be 
dissolved and new elections would be held in December 1985 based on the new electoral rolls 
(The Indian Express, August 16, 1985).    
  
Conclusion 
 This empirical analysis of the dynamics of the demobilization of the protest campaign in 
Assam has several implications for the study of nonviolent campaigns.  First, it offers an 
alternative causal mechanism for the demobilization of a protest campaign by demonstrating that 
critical events can trigger demobilization.  Communal violence in ethnically divided societies 
can curtail mass support for the protest campaign and force campaign leaders to suspend protest 
activities.  While scholars have often highlighted the escalatory effects of critical events, this 
analysis shows that they can also be important turning points in the demobilization of a protest 
campaign.  
Second, this study suggests that the participation of large numbers of people and the 
inclusion of various sectors and groups do not always set off mechanisms that lead to success. 
Even if repression triggers a backfire effect and motivates larger number of people to participate, 
campaigns can still demobilize. Indeed, similar to Piven and Cloward’s (1977) and Tarrow’s 
(1989) models, the Assam case shows that broadening the support base makes coalition 
maintenance challenging in ethnically divided societies.  When communal violence against 
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Muslim immigrants occurred in Assam, Muslim protesters withdrew their support, forcing the 
campaign leadership temporarily to shift their strategy from confronting political authorities to 
trying to unify the different groups within the campaign. 
 Third, the Assam case shows that violent protest activity does not necessarily undermine 
the strength of a protest campaign as scholars of nonviolent resistance maintain.  Although 
protesters resorted to violent tactics, mobilization levels remained high throughout the first four 
years of the campaign.  Instead, a critical event, communal violence, eventually led to the 
demobilization of the protest campaign.  In line with Davenport and Moore’s (2012) call for 
better mapping and understanding of diverse forms of political conflict and violence, this study 
indicates that various types of violence can have differential effects on protest dynamics. 
 From a policy standpoint, the implications of the Assam campaign for states and activists 
are quite alarming.  In ethnically divided societies, protests that highlight ethnic differences can 
have unintended violent consequences and lead to deeper societal cleavages in the long term.  
States should be aware of this potential and calculate the costs of repressing and fueling protests 
by taking into account the possibility of large-scale communal violence.  Likewise, protesters 
should develop strategies to prevent the escalation of ethnic tension as it can have detrimental 
effects on the campaign. 
At a more general level, the Assam case illustrates the unpredictable nature of protest 
dynamics.  Scholars of political contention have long recognized the challenges associated with 
identifying causal pathways due to the unpredictability of contentious interactions between 
multiple actors.  This study explains how an unpredictable event can demobilize a protest 
campaign.  Although this study has limitations in its generalizability across different campaigns 
due to the unique communal patterns and protest dynamics in Assam, it highlights an alternative 
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causal path to demobilization and, thus, brings scholars one step closer to understanding the 
complex dynamics of contentious politics.  
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A. EXPLANATION OF CODING PROCEDURES AND THE CODEBOOK 
 
1. Coding Procedures 
 
I followed multiple steps to construct the codebook and weight the data. First, I identified 
the four broad event categories that I needed data for: 1) state accommodation; 2) state 
repression; 3) group collective action; and 4) external support to the group. These categories 
were followed by the lists of actors involved in the Assamese protest campaign. 
For state actions, I relied on a majority of Krain’s (2000) list of repressive and 
accommodative events.26 Krain includes a variety of repressive state actions, ranging from 
seizing assets to use of torture, as well as a comprehensive list of accommodative actions ranging 
from increasing security of target group to incorporation into government.  Even though these 
lists cover a wide range of events, I discovered some additional categories that were essential to 
my four cases throughout the coding process.  Therefore, I added violent arrests of opposition 
leaders; halt negotiations; curfews; declaration of President’s Rule or Governor’s Rule;27 
teargassing; violent disruption of group organization; beating up; clashes with group; damaging 
property; bombing; burning houses and bridges; and burning entire villages to the repressive 
events lists. These events came up with some frequency and provided detailed information about 
the exact form of events.  
I then labeled the repressive events based on their objectives and decision making 
agencies. Preventive repression corresponds to repressive acts imposed by higher level 
authorities, such as the government or the judiciary, to demobilize the contenders and to prevent 
future acts of contention. The declaration of martial law, and the restriction of the right of 
assembly, for instance, fall into this category of repression. Reactionary repression, on the other 
hand, stands for repressive acts of lower level agents, such as the police, applied during the 
course of a contentious episode in an attempt to respond to collective action and maintain or re-
establish order. Teargassing the protesters or damaging property are examples of reactionary 
repression. I consider arrests as a separate category because it is not always clear if arrests result 
from centralized policy directives, or if they are consequences of ad-hoc decisions made by the 
local police. Finally, I grouped all repressive events under six broader categories: Restrict; Seize; 
Warn; Judicial Actions; Non-Judicial Actions; and Use of Force. 
Regarding the state’s accommodative policies, I expanded Krain’s list by adding 
organizing discussion meetings or committees, and withdrawal of army. The Indian state used 
these two types of policies during the protest waves and insurgencies as a form of 
accommodation.  Again, I grouped similar types of events under broader categories: 
Negotiations; Judicial Accommodation; Non-Judicial Accommodation; and Group Recognition. 
For the purpose of systematic coding, I arbitrarily assigned the broad categories a 3-digit code 
and the specific event types a 4-digit code which started with the first two digits of the broader 
category.  All repressive events that involve violence were assigned a 9 at the very end (thus, 
violent actions are all 5-digit codes ending with 9).  All the codes for accommodative events start 
                                                          
26 I did not include mass killings because some form of military armed attack, burning villages or bombing already 
covered this category.   
27 Article 356 of the Constitution of India grants the President the right to dissolve or suspend a state legislature and 
place the state under direct federal rule if he is satisfied that there has been failure of the constitutional machinery in 
the state. 
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with a 1 and the repressive ones start with a 2. This code assignment was particularly helpful 
later throughout the data management process because it made it easier to identify similar types 
of events and their respective broader categories for aggregation purposes. It also helped me to 
detect miscoding, if any, more easily. The following are examples of categories of 
accommodation and repression with their respective codes.  
For group actions, I used a majority of the Violent International Conflict Data Project 
(VICDP) events list (Moore and Lindstrom 1996).  The VICDP is a data project, which has 
generated conflict and cooperation data at the sub-national level. Events from the Integrated Data 
for Event Analysis Framework (IDEA) (Bond,Bond,Oh,Jenkins and Taylor 2003) was also 
helpful in identifying specific events that were not included in the VICDP project, such as 
hijacking, and taking hostages. For the purpose of distinguishing between situations in which 
violence is or is not used, I added the “violent” versions of demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins to 
the list. I also created two separate categories for demonstrations based on size. Demonstrations 
with less than 200 participants are coded as small scale and the ones with more than 200 are 
coded as large scale. Even though the cut-off point of 200 participants is arbitrary, there is a 
pragmatic reason behind it. The Indian Express usually reports massive demonstrations as 
featuring “hundreds” or “thousands” of demonstrators. I am conservatively interpreting 
“hundreds” as at least 200, and therefore, using it as my cut-off point. 
After completing the list for group actions, I grouped those under five broader categories: 
Accommodative Group Actions; Low Intensity Collective Action; Medium Intensity Collective 
Action; and High Intensity Collective Action.  Again, the broader category was assigned a 3-
digit code and the specific events were assigned a 4-digit code.  All the events that involved 
violence were assigned a 9 at the end. All collective action events start with a 5.  
In addition to collective action I included a “Splits” category for groups to code 
information about group cohesion. The list of events in this category does not reflect a wide 
range of group characteristics because the scope of the study is not on organizational aspects of 
the groups. Instead, it includes the events that are the results of splits within a group. These 
specific events are disagreement between factions; forming an organization as a result of split; 
expelling members; armed attack against other factions; and militants surrendering. These 
events also have codes starting with a 5 because they are related to groups.  
For the list of acts of external support to the group, I built on Heraclides’ (1990:368-69) 
list of events which are specifically designed to fit cases with external involvement in 
secessionist conflicts.  For example, some of the events in his list including providing access to 
communication, providing sanctuary and training, or giving direct military assistance such as 
armed intervention constituted the basis of the list for external support to the group.  I also added 
firing across borders and granting asylum to leadership of group to the list to make it more 
comprehensive.  All the events for external support to the group are arranged under two larger 
categories: Material and Diplomatic/Political Support. Material Support has three sub-categories 
based on the level of involvement: Low, Moderate and High. The 3 digit codes for these main 
categories start with an 8 and the specific events have 5 digit codes, just like the rest of the 
codebook.  
While compiling the list of events for state, group, and external actor actions, I 
deliberately attempted to include similar policy options across the board. Obviously, the same 
exact policy options that are available to the state are not available for the group and vice versa. 
However, if the state has the option of putting down a demonstration, then demonstration is 
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included among the list of group actions; and so is allowing demonstrations in state’s own 
territory for external support actions. 
Finally, for the list of actors and targets, I used the actor/target list in Moore and 
Lindstrom’s (1996) VICDP as a starting point for my initial deliberations on what kind of actors 
to include. The specific party names and factions, names of governors, chief ministers, names of 
religious or ethnic groups along with broader categories of students, peasants, workers, and 
businessmen, for instance, are listed in the codebook. These specific actors were organized based 
on 7 types of actors and targets: State, Social Actors, Political Parties, Religious Groups / 
Populations, Insurgent Groups, State Enforcement, and External Actors. All the broader 
categories have 5 digit codes and the specific actors and targets have 6 digit codes. If there is 
more detailed information available, then those more specific ones have 7 digit codes. For 
example, in Assam, the code for the State is 33100, for the Governor 331011, and for Governor 
Shri T.S. Misra, it is 3310113.  
Once the entire list of events was compiled, I assigned scores to each event to reflect the 
intensity of these events more realistically. It would simply not be accurate to assume that the 
state’s restriction of assembly has the same impact as launching an armed attack.  If both of these 
events would be assigned a score of 1 (or simply counted by frequency), it might very well be 
possible that restriction of assembly ends up having more weight in the statistical analysis than 
launching armed attacks against the group if its frequency is higher. In order to make the analysis 
more accurate, the weights of those events needs to be taken into consideration.  
For assigning weights, my starting point was, once again, Krain’s (2000) scale of 
repression and accommodation.  Krain’s scale is initially based on the rankings of 30 experts in 
the field. The experts were asked to rank the repressive and accommodative events on a 1 to 5 
scale. The average scores for each event were calculated and then rounded to the nearest whole 
number. To be able to make finer distinctions, Krain took the square of the raw average score 
and assigned new scores to the events ranging from 1 to 25 (Krain 2000:42-43). So, for example, 
while arresting opposition leader and armed attack received a score of 3 by the expert rankings, 
Krain scored them as 7 and 12 respectively.  By expanding the range of the weights, Krain 
gained enough flexibility to rank events which originally fell into the same score category.   
As a wider range of scores allows me to rank the events with more precision and thus to 
see the increases or decreases in the intensity of the actions, I decided to use a range between 1 
and 25 as well.  I first assigned similar scores to the repressive and accommodative events that 
Krain had on his list.  Then I ranked the events which I had added in the previous step that were 
not in Krain’s list. For example, while arresting opposition leaders is on Krain’s original list, I 
included violent arrests of opposition leaders into my list of repressive events. These additions 
inevitably led to the modification of several scores. The addition of a violent event to the list 
meant that it had to have a score more than the non-violent version of it.  So, the score was 
assigned based on other violent events with similar intensity. As a general principle, the violent 
events were assigned a 4 point higher score than the non-violent versions.28 Once this rule was 
established, similar events were modified based on the same principle. Finally, I made some 
adjustments to the scale based on case-specific characteristics. Throughout the data collection 
process, I read thousands of newspaper articles on the same subject, which gave me a good 
understanding of the actions of the state and the groups. I was, therefore, able to understand how 
the state used certain types of policies in what kind of context and used this insight to modify the 
                                                          
28 This 4 point difference is enough to account for the difference in intensity, yet does not place the violent and non-
violent versions of the same event at the extreme ends of the scale.  
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scale. For example, while declaration of martial law has a score of 10 in Krain’s scale, it is 21 in 
my scale because the Indian state declared martial law in situations where other repressive 
measures had already been taken and martial law was seen as the only option left to halt the 
further deterioration of law and order. Therefore, declaration of martial law was assigned a 
dramatically higher score than violent or non-violent putdown of demonstrations. Even with 
these various modifications, the correlation coefficient for accommodative and repressive events 
between the new scale and Krain’s scale is relatively strong (.92 and .78 respectively). 
I then applied these similar guidelines to assign scores to group actions and external 
support events. The most severe forms of collective action and external support events were 
assigned scores closer to 25 and the least severe were assigned scores closer to 1. Actions 
included as options under both the state actions or group actions received similar scores.  For 
example, armed attack receives a score of 20 both in the list of state’s repressive actions and the 
group’s most threatening actions list. Similarly, negotiating receives the same score of 6 in both 
the state’s and group’s conciliatory actions lists.  
This systematic and consistent procedure of assigning weights was particularly important 
in ensuring some degree of balance and objectivity in this otherwise subjective process. 
Subjectivity is a legitimate concern both with Krain’s scale and also with my scale as, indeed, it 
is with any other weighting scheme.  As there are no objective criteria used to rank such events, 
any ranking inevitably involves some kind of a judgment call on the researcher’s part. However, 
the application of the same principles across all types of actions will reduce the bias to a 
minimum and prevent it from affecting the analysis in a significant way.  
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2.  CODEBOOK 
EVENT LIST FOR ACCOMMODATION 
     
Main Category Specific Category Code  
Adjusted 
Weight  
(W)  
    
NEGOTIATIONS    110   
 Broad statement of guarantee of rights 1111 4 
 Low-level concession  1112 1 
 Compromise reached  1113 15 
 Negotiations begun 1114 6 
    
    
JUDICIAL ACCOMMODATION 120   
 
Reduction in fines, taxes, fees, 
 punishment for compellance 1211 4 
 Removing restrictive law/regulation  1212 5 
 Allowing emigration 1213 7 
 Allowing return from exile  1214 8 
 
Outlawing repressive apparatus institution, 
practice  1215 8 
 Prosecution of enemies of target group  1216 1 
 Stays of execution  1217 5 
 Freeing prisoners 1218 10 
 General Amnesty  1220 14 
 Legalizing Group Membership  1221 12 
    
    
NON-JUDICIAL ACCOMMODATION 130   
 Organizing discussion meetings, committees  1311 3 
 Increasing access to information 1312 4 
 Providing selective incentives 1313 8 
 Giving positive publicity 1314 4 
 
Introducing enabling 
mechanisms/entitlement 1315 6 
 Increasing opportunities for participation 1316 9 
 
Small-scale diversion of 
resources to group 1317 5 
 Abandoning project hurtful to group 1318 4 
 Increasing security of target group 1320 1 
 Increasing access to markets 1321 9 
 
Large-scale redistribution of 
assets/resources 1322 10 
 Direct aid (money, forces) to challenger 1323 12 
 Withdrawal of Army  1324 16 
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GROUP RECOGNITION 140   
 Encouraging/allowing separatism 1411 18 
 Incorporation into government  1412 25 
    
OTHER    910   
        
 
EVENT LIST FOR REPRESSION     
Main Category Specific Category Code  
Adjusted 
Weight  
(W)  
RESTRICT   210   
Preventive Repression 
Restricting access to resources, 
necessities, jobs 2111 6 
 Restricting assembly 2112 5 
 
Restricting freedom of  
communication, speech 
and distribution of information 2113 5 
 Restricting emigration, mobility  2114 6 
 Prohibitive fines, taxes, fees, regulation  2115 4 
    
    
SEIZE   220   
Preventive Repression Seizing assets 2211 7 
Arrest Arrests/ Detentions 2212 9 
 Mass Arrests (>25) 2213 14 
 Non-violent Arrest of Opposition Leaders  2418 10 
 Violent Arrest of Opposition Leaders 24199 14 
    
    
WARN   230   
Preventive Repression Public threat of violence/punishment 2311 5 
 Show of force 2312 6 
 Exemplary punishment/deterrent 2313 9 
 Show trials/political trials 2314 8 
 Compellance: Punishing non-performance 2315 4 
 Expulsion/purge from party or ruling elite 2316 3 
 Making groups more visible, easily spotted 2317 4 
 Halt Negotiations 2318 6 
JUDICIAL ACTIONS    240   
Preventive Repression Curfew  2411 10 
 Martial law declared 2412 21 
 “Special” extra-legal courts set-up 2413 8 
 
Suspension of parts of constitution or  
the regular workings of government / issuing 
ordinance 2414 16 
 Outlawing organizations, groups, industries  2415 15 
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Suspending or censoring news 
media/speech  2416 14 
 Ousting groups from government 2417 15 
 Exiles/expulsions 2420 10 
 Trials in absentia  2421 14 
 Forced conscription 2422 8 
 President's Rule/Governor's Rule  2423 18 
 Religious suppression/persecution 2424 9 
    
NON-JUDICIAL ACTIONS  250   
Reactionary Repression 
Non-violent putdown of 
demonstration/strikes/hartals 2511 7 
 
Violent putdown of 
demonstration/strikes/hartals,  
lathi-charging and teargassing 25119 11 
 Non-violent disruption of group organization 2512 7 
 Violent disruption of group organization 25129 11 
 
Calling in  
additional police posts/ secret police/special 
forces 2514 6 
    
USE OF FORCE    260   
Reactionary Repression Beating up  26119 11 
 Clashes with group  26129 14 
 Use of torture 26139 16 
 Forced resettlement 26149 18 
 Armed attack 26159 20 
 Forced labor 26169 12 
 
Forced subjugation/integration 
of communities  26179 9 
 Disappearance  26189 21 
 Damaging property  26199 14 
 Bombing  26209 21 
 Burning houses, bridges, etc.  26219 21 
 Burning entire villages 26229 25 
 Manufactured famine or draught 26239 20 
 Mass rape 26249 21 
 Concentration Camps 26259 18 
OTHER   920   
Note: All actions that involve violence end with 9.   
EVENT LIST FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
      
Main Category Specific Category Code  
 Weight  
(W)  
     
ACCOMMODATIVE ACTIONS 510   
 
Broad statement of guarantee 
of rights and security of government officials 5111 4 
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 Low-level concession  5112 1 
 Compromise reached  5113 15 
 Negotiations begun 5114 6 
 Freeing hostages/prisoners 5115 10 
  
Abandoning plans/actions/strikes/boycotts / 
demonstrations etc. hurtful to state 5116 4 
 
Allowing government access to 
resources, mines, oil facilities, etc.  5117 9 
 Renouncing secessionist goals 5118 16 
 Acceptance of an Agreement 5120 18 
 Termination of Separatist Movement 5121 20 
 Announcing ceasefire 5122 15 
    
 CONTENTIOUS ACTIONS     
LOW INTENSITY COLLECTIVE ACTION 520   
 
Mild negative statements 
about federal government  5211 1 
 
Mild negative statements 
about local government 5212 1 
 
Strong negative statements 
about federal government 5213 3 
 
Strong negative statements 
about local government 5214 3 
 Organizing meetings  5311 6 
 Distributing information  5312 5 
 Forming an organization 5313 8 
    
MEDIUM INTENSITY COLLECTIVE ACTION 540   
 Non-violent Strike (hartal)  5411 7 
  Violent Strike (hartal)  54119 11 
 Non-Violent Bandh (general strike) 5412 9 
 Violent Bandh (general strike)  54129 11 
 
Non-violent Small-scale demonstrations 
 (less than 200 participants)  5413 7 
 
Violent Small-scale demonstrations 
(less than 200participants) 54139 11 
 
Non-violent Large-scale demonstrations 
 (more than 200 participants)  5414 10 
 
Violent Large-scale demonstrations 
 (more than 200 participants) 54149 11 
 Non-violent Sit-ins  5415 7 
 Violent Sit-ins  54159 11 
 Commercial Boycotts  5416 7 
 Electoral boycotts  5417 10 
 Halt negotiations 5418 6 
 Forming a political wing / party  5420 12 
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 Running candidate in the election  5421 12 
 Threat of violence/agitation 5422 5 
 Violation of curfew, martial law, etc.  5423 5 
    
HIGH INTENSITY COLLECTIVE ACTION 550   
 
Surveillance, links with spies,  
acquiring information through clandestine means 5424 7 
 Assaults 55109 11 
 Robbery/stealing-damaging property 55119 14 
 Clashes  55129 15 
 Direct confrontation with army or paramilitaries 55299 20 
 Sabotage 55139 17 
 Abduct tourists/journalists/citizens 55149 15 
 Abduct and execute tourists/journalists/citizens  55249 20 
 Abduct politicians 55159 16 
 Abduct and execute politicians 55259 20 
 Seizing  buildings  55169 17 
 Using training camps  55179 16 
 Securing access to arms  55189 16 
 Armed attack 55199 20 
 Bombing  55209 21 
 Riots 55219 17 
 Burning houses, bridges, etc.  55229 21 
 Burning entire villages 55239 25 
    
OTHER   950   
    
All actions that involve violence en with 9.   
    
    
SPLITS       
Main Category Specific Category Code  
 Weight  
(W)  
 Disagreements between factions 5611 5 
 Forming an organization as a result of splits  5612 10 
 Expelling members 5614 7 
 Armed attack against other factions 56139 20 
 Militants surrendering 5615 10 
    
EVENT LIST FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE STATE 
      
Main Category Specific Category Code  
 Weight  
(W)  
MATERIAL SUPPORT 810   
LOW Humanitarian Aid 8111 2 
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MEDIUM   820   
 Providing Financial Assistance 8211 10 
 
Providing Vital Access to 
communication 8212 10 
 
Threatening to use force against group 
on state's behalf 8213 5 
HIGH    830   
 Non-injury destructive action against group 8311 13 
 Providing Arms 8312 15 
 Providing Military Personnel  8313 17 
 Border seal 8314 15 
 Border skirmishes (support state) 8315 17 
 Full scale military intervention support 8316 21 
DIPLOMATIC / POLITICAL SUPPORT 840   
 Mild Verbal Statements 8411 1 
 Strong Verbal Statements 8412 3 
 
Support in Intergovernmental  
Organizations 8413 10 
 Campaigns in Support of State 8414 10 
 
Banning groups to exist/function 
in the state's own territory / expulsion of group 8415 8 
 
Banning demonstrations/protests, etc. in the 
state's own territory 8416 8 
 Detaining or arresting group members 8417 10 
OTHER   981   
 
EVENT LIST FOR EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE GROUP 
      
Main Category Specific Category Code  
Weight  
(W)  
TANGIBLE SUPPORT 850   
LOW Humanitarian Aid 8511 2 
    
    
MODERATE  860   
 Providing Sanctuary/training 8611 14 
 Providing Base of Operation 8612 14 
 Providing Financial Assistance 8613 10 
 
Providing Vital Access to 
communication 8614 10 
 
Threatening the state to intervene 
on group's behalf 8615 5 
       
HIGH - PHYSICAL 
INVOLVEMENT   870   
 Non-injury destructive action against state 8711 13 
 Providing Arms 8712 15 
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Providing Military Personnel under secessionist 
command 8713 17 
 Border closures 8714 15 
 Border skirmishes (support group) 8715 17 
 Firing Across Borders 8716 16 
 Full scale military intervention 8717 21 
    
    
DIPLOMATIC / POLITICAL SUPPORT 880   
 Mild Verbal Statements 8811 1 
 Strong Verbal Statements 8812 3 
 
Support in Intergovernmental  
Organizations 8813 10 
 Campaigns in Support of Groups 8814 10 
 
Allowing groups to exist/function 
in the state's own territory 8815 8 
 
Allowing demonstrations/protests, etc. in the 
state's own territory 8816 8 
 
Freeing detained/arrested group 
members out of prison 8817 10 
 Granting Asylum to leadership of group 8818 14 
    
OTHER   985   
 
 
   
ACTORS /TARGETS FOR ASSAM    
    
STATE   33100  
 Federal Government 331001  
 Local Government 331002  
 Governor 331011  
 Shri L.P. Singh, ICS 3310111  
 Shri P. Mehrotra 3310112  
 Shri T.S. Misra 3310113  
 Shri B. N. Sing 3310114  
 Shri Harideo Joshi 3310115  
 
Shri Justice Anisetti Roghuvir, Chief 
Justice, Assam 3310116  
 Shri D. D. Thakur 3310117  
 Shri Lok Nath Misra 3310118  
 Chief Minister 331003  
 CM Shri Golap Borbora 3310031  
 CM Shri Jogenda Nath Hazarika 3310032  
 CM Shrimati Anowara Taimur 3310033  
 CM Shri Kesab Chandra Gogoi 3310034  
 CM Shri Hiteswar Saikia 3310035  
 CM Shri Prafulla Kumar Mahanta 3310036  
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SOCIAL ACTORS   33110  
 Media 331101  
 Students 331102  
 Workers 331103  
 Peasants 331104  
 Educators 331105  
 Politicians 331106  
 Political Activists 331107  
 Elites 331108  
 Local Tourists 331109  
 Foreign Tourists 331110  
 Foreign Journalists 331111  
 Foreign Politicians 331112  
 Bengali nationals trying to immigrate 331113  
 Civil servants 331114  
 Nepali nationals trying to immigrate 331115  
 Businessmen/traders 331116  
 Foreign businessmen/traders 331117  
 Other 33910  
    
    
POLITICAL PARTIES 33120  
 Congress Party  331201  
 Janata Party 331202  
 BJP  331203  
 Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) 331204  
 Asom Gana Parishad (Splinter) 3312045  
 United Minorities Front  331205  
 Other 33920  
    
RELIGIOUS GROUPS 33130  
 Muslims  331301  
 Hindus 331302  
 Sikhs  333103  
 Buddhists 331304  
 Christian 331305  
 Other 33930  
    
ETHNIC GROUPS   33140  
 Population 331401  
 Assamese  331402  
 Bangladeshi immigrants 331403  
 Tribals 331404  
 Nepalese 331405  
 Bodos 331406  
 Hindi-speaking people 331407  
 Other  33940  
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AGITATING/INSURGENT GROUPS 33150  
 United Liberation Front of Assam 331501  
 All Assamese Student Union (AASU) 331502  
 
All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad 
(AAGSP) 331503  
 Asom Sahitya Sabha  331504  
 
All Assam Minority Students Union (not 
insurgent) 331505  
 Lok Parishad 331506  
 
Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chhatra Parishad 
(AJYCP) - Assam Nationalistic Youth and 
Students Forum) 331507  
 Other 33950  
    
    
STATE ENFORCEMENT 33160  
 Police  331601  
 Paramilitary troops  331602  
 Army 331603  
 Border Security Force  331604  
 Other 33960  
    
EXTERNAL ACTORS 33170  
 US 331701  
 United Kingdom 331702  
 United Nations 331703  
 Regional Organizations 331704  
 China 331705  
 Bhutan 331706  
 Bangladesh 331707  
 Nepal 331708  
 Burma (Myanmar) 331709  
 Pakistan 331710  
 Other 33970  
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B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
TABLE B-1 Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables (Weighted) 
Variable Observation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Protest Activity 345 45.81 131.57 0 1278 
Repression 345 38.95 110.18 0 866 
Accommodation 345 5.60 13.19 0 96 
Heavy Violence 345 32.56 80.22 0 780 
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C. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
TABLE C-1 ZINB and PAR Estimates for Number of Protest Activity in Assam (Unweighted 
Data) 
 
Variable 
 
Critical Event Model 
 
Protest Violence 
Model 
 
Pre-Communal 
Violence Model 
 
Post-Communal 
Violence Model 
 ZINB PAR ZINB PAR ZINB PAR ZINB PAR 
Time   -0.003 
  (0.002) 
  0.003* 
  (0.001) 
  -0.007** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.001 
 (0.002) 
 
     - 
 
       - 
 
      - 
 
      - 
Intervention 
(Riot) 
-1.953** 
  (0.704) 
-1.266* 
 (0.532) 
 -1.304* 
 (0.634) 
 -0.761 
 (0.633) 
 
     - 
 
       - 
 
      - 
 
      - 
Post-Intervention   -0.006 
  (0.006) 
  -  
0.024*** 
(0.005) 
  0.009 
 (0.008) 
 -0.015* 
 (0.006) 
 
     - 
 
       - 
 
      - 
 
      - 
Repression  
 
   0.051*** 
  (0.010) 
       
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
  0.032*** 
  (0.008) 
  0.039*** 
 (0.004) 
0.041***
(0.009) 
0 .040*** 
(0.004) 
  0.075† 
 (0.043) 
 0.226*** 
(0.036) 
Accommodation   -0.077 
  (0.050) 
-0.085* 
(0.037) 
  -0.049 
  (0.053) 
 -0.068* 
 (0.039) 
-0.040 
(0.050) 
 0.072* 
(0.036)
 
 -0.192 
 (0.138) 
-0.064 
(0.210) 
High violence 
 
 
- 
 
- 
   0.053* 
  (0.023) 
  0.005 
(0.009) 
 
     - 
 
      - 
 
      - 
 
     - 
Constant   2.296*** 
  (0.310) 
  
1.172*** 
(0.208) 
  2.736*** 
 (0.309) 
1.414*** 
(0.203) 
2.059*** 
(0.171) 
1.577*** 
(0.113) 
1.190*** 
(0.320) 
 -0.018 
 (0.224) 
AR parameter 1 
(lag one) 
 
      - 
    
0.567*** 
(0.056) 
     
- 
 0.520*** 
(0.054) 
 
     -  
 0.658*** 
(0.069) 
   
      - 
  0.437*** 
 (0.089) 
AR parameter 2 
(lag two) 
 
      - 
-0.102* 
(0.047) 
  
-     
-0.066 
(0.048) 
      
     - 
-0.138* 
(0.057) 
 
      - 
  0.004 
 (0.087) 
N   345     343 345   343   215 213    125 123 
Probability>chi-
square 
  
0.000 
 
- 
 
0.000 
 
- 
 
  0.000 
 
       - 
 
   0.029 
 
- 
Adjusted R2 -    0.59 -  0.54      -     0.62       - 0.33 
† p<.10, *p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; All significant tests are two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE C-2 ZINB and PAR Estimates for Violent and Nonviolent Protest Activity in Assam 
 
Variable 
 
Nonviolent Protest Activity 
 
Violent Protest Activity 
 ZINB PAR ZINB PAR 
Time -0.006*** 
        (0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
  0.012** 
         (0.004) 
    0.022** 
(0.007) 
Intervention 
(Riot) 
        -1.259* 
        (0.532) 
         -1.788* 
         (0.726) 
2.743* 
(1.357) 
           3.215*** 
          (0.529) 
Post-Intervention         -0.006 
        (0.006) 
         -0.014* 
         (0.006) 
          -0.037* 
(0.018) 
-0.090* 
          (0.036) 
Repression  
 
 0.003*** 
        (0.001) 
   0.004*** 
         (0.000) 
   0.008** 
(0.003) 
          -0.000 
          (0.000) 
Accommodation         -0.017* 
        (0.008) 
-0.025** 
         (0.007) 
          -0.047 
(0.030) 
 0.030* 
          (0.012) 
Constant   4.887*** 
        (0.258) 
  3.580*** 
        (0.195) 
    2.611** 
          (0.797) 
           0.923 
         (1.389) 
AR parameter 1 (lag 
one) 
 
- 
 0.492*** 
        (0.055) 
 
- 
0.088† 
          (0.046) 
AR parameter 2 (lag 
two) 
 
- 
        -0.048 
        (0.049) 
 
-  
    0.087 
          (0.059) 
N 
 
  345             343 345 343 
Probability>chi-square  0.000               -             0.000                 - 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
- 
     
           0.59 
 
- 
 
0.32 
† p<.10, *p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; All significant tests are two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE C-3 Critical Event Model and Cooptation Model Estimates of Protest Activity (January 
1979 – June 1983) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Critical Event 
Model 
 
Cooptation 
Model 
 
Time 
       
    0.002 
   (0.002) 
     
    0.004† 
   (0.002) 
 
Intervention 
(Communal Violence) 
  
   -2.777*** 
   (0.733) 
 
- 
 
Post-Intervention 
 
   -0.163* 
   (0.073) 
 
- 
 
Repression  
 
  
    0.004*** 
   (0.001) 
 
- 
 
Accommodation 
 
   -0.016 
   (0.012) 
  
    0.004 
   (0.013) 
 
Constant 
  
    4.089 
   (0.350)*** 
  
    4.265*** 
   (0.381) 
 
N 
  
       232 
 
      232 
 
Probability>chi-square 
  
    0.000 
 
 
    0.2083 
† p<.10, *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; All significant tests are two-tailed, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
  
59 
 
 
References: 
 
Alimi, Eitan Y. (2009) Mobilizing under the Gun: Theorizing Political Opportunity Structure in 
a Highly Repressive Setting. Mobilization 14(2):219-37. 
Baruah, Sanjib. (1986) Immigration, Ethnic Conflict, and Political Turmoil--Assam, 1979-1985. 
Asian Survey 26(11):1184-206. 
———. (1999) India against Itself : Assam and the Politics of Nationality. Critical Histories. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Beissinger, Mark R. (2002) Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bond, Doug, Joe Bond, Churl Oh, J. Craig Jenkins, and Charles Lewis Taylor. (2003) Integrated 
Data for Events Analysis (Idea): An Event Typology for Automated Events Data 
Development. Journal of Peace Research 40(6):733-45. 
Brandt, Patrick T., and John T. Williams. (2001) A Linear Poisson Autoregressive Model: The 
Poisson Ar(P) Model. Political Analysis 9(2):164-84. 
Brandt, Patrick T., John T. Williams, Benjamin A. Fordham, and Brian Pollins. (2000) Dynamic 
Modeling for Persistent Event Count Time Series. American Journal of Political Science 
44(4):823-43. 
Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. (2007) The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism. World Politics 59(3):341-
69. 
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. (2011) Why Civil Resistance Works : The Strategic 
Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. (2002) Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, 
the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Notre Dame, Ind. :: 
University of Notre Dame Press. 
Davenport, Christian, and Will H. Moore. (2012) The Arab Spring, Winter, and Back Again? 
(Re)Introducing the Dissent-Repression Nexus with a Twist. International Interactions 
38(5):704-13. 
Day, Joel, Jonathan Pinckney, and Erica Chenoweth. (2015) Collecting Data on Nonviolent 
Action: Lessons Learnd and Ways Forward. Journal of Peace Research 52(1):129-33. 
della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney Tarrow. (1986) Unwanted Children: Political Violence and 
the Cycle of Protest in Italy: 1966-1973. European Journal of Political Research 14. 
DeVotta, Neil. (2004) Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic 
Conflict in Sri Lanka. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Dunning, Thad. (2011) Fighting and Voting: Violent Conflict and Electoral Politics. The Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 55(3):327-39. 
Earl, Jennifer, Andrew Martin, John D. McCarthy, and Sarah A. Soule. (2004) The Use of 
Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action. Annual Review of Sociology 3065-80. 
Farnum, Nicholas.R., and LaVerne W. Stanton. (1989) Quantitative Forecasting Methods. PWS-
Kent Pub. 
Francisco, Ronald A. (1995) The Relationship between Coercion and Protest: An Empirical 
Evaluation in Three Coercive States. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 39(2):263-82. 
60 
 
Gandhi, Rajmohan. April 11. 1983, 1983 Assam: Some Questions and Answers. The Indian 
Express, 5. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Bcsia Studies in International Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. (1995) The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: 
The Impact of Political Shocks. American Journal of Political Science 39(1):30-52. 
Gupta, Shekhar February 24, 1983 Assam Violence Has No Set Pattern. The Indian Express, 7. 
Heraclides, Alexis. (1990) Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement. International 
Organization 44(3):341-78. 
Horowitz, Donald L. (2001) The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kimura, Makiko. (2013) The Nellie Massacre of 1983: Agency of Rioters. New Delhi: Sage 
Publications India. 
Koopmans, Ruud. (1997) Dynamics of Repression and Mobilization: The German Extreme 
Right in the 1990s. Mobilization 2(2):149-65. 
Krain, Matthew. (2000) Repression and Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary States. 1st ed. 
New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Linden, Ariel, and John L. Adams. (2011) Applying a Propensity Score-Based Weighting Model 
to Interrupted Time Series Data: Improving Causal Inference in Programme Evaluation. 
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 17(6):1231-38. 
Lohmann, Susanne. (1994) The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday 
Demonstrations in Leipzig, East German, 1989-91. World Politics 47(October):42-101. 
Long, Scott. (1997) Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Mahoney, James. (2001) The Legacies of Liberalism : Path Dependence and Political Regimes 
in Central America. Baltimore :: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
McAdam, Doug. (1983) Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency. American Sociological 
Review 48(6):735-54. 
McCarthy, John D., Clark McPhail, and Jackie Smith. (1996) Images of Protest: Dimensions of 
Selection Bias in Media Coverage of Washington Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991. 
American Sociological Review 61(3):478-99. 
Meyer, David S., and Suzanne Staggenborg. (1996) Movements, Countermovements, and the 
Structure of Political Opportunity. American Journal of Sociology 101(6):1628-60. 
Moore, Will H., and Ronny Lindstrom. (1996) The Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project 
(Vicdp) Codebook. Department of Political Science, University of California - Riverside. 
Narayan, Hemendra. February 19, 1985 Show of Strength by Assam Agitation Leaders. Indian 
Express. 
Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. (2011) Nonviolent Revolutions : Civil Resistance in the Late 20th 
Century. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. (1977) Poor People's Movements: Why They 
Suceed, How They Fail. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Polanyi, Karl. (1957) The Great Tansformation. New York :: Rinehart. 
Rasler, Karen. (1996) Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution. 
American Sociological Review 61(1):132-52. 
Rasler, Karen A., William R. Thompson, and Sumit Ganguly. (2013) How Rivalries End. 1st ed. 
ed. Philadelphia :: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
61 
 
Schock, Kurt. (2013) The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance. Journal of Peace Research 
50(3):277-90. 
———. (2005) Unarmed Insurrections : People Power Movements in Nondemocracies. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Sharp, Gene. (1973) The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston, MA.: Porter Sargent. 
Shawki, Noha. (2012) The 2008 Food Crisis as a Critical Event for the Food Sovereignty and 
Food Justice Movements. International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 
19(3):423-44. 
Staggenborg, Suzanne. (1993) Critical Events and the Mobilization of the Pro-Choice 
Movement. Research in Political Sociology 6319-45. 
Svensson, Isak, and Mathilda Lindgren. (2011) From Bombs to Banners? The Decline of Wars 
and the Rise of Unarmed Uprisings in East Asia. Security Dialogue 43(2):219-37. 
Tarrow, Sidney G. (1989) Democracy and Disorder : Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. (1998) Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge 
Studies in Comparative Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tilly, Charles. (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. 
Co. 
Tilly, Charles, and Sidney G. Tarrow. (2007) Contentious Politics. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm 
Publishers. 
Varshney, Ashutosh. (2002) Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life : Hindus and Muslims in India. New 
Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press. 
 
